On Turkey and Europe

A friend recently complained about Russia hosting Eurovision because “Russia isn’t in Europe”, to which I felt the need to respond that it may not be entirely in Europe, but its population mostly is, and in any case the definition of Europe is both arbitrary and historically fluid. Strangely, this same friend did not object to the appearance of Turkey (let alone Israel…). But this got me thinking again about one of my favourite bugbears, and that’s the issue of Turkey and Europe.

The division of the known world into the three continents of Europe, Asia and Africa dates back to the ancient Greeks. Initially, the boundaries were taken to be the Nile and Don rivers, but even in ancient times there were objectors who thought it better to use isthmuses – which helps somewhat in the case of Africa, but not so much for Europe. The currently-accepted line along the Ural and Caucasus mountains and the Bosporous has its basis neither in the sciences or the humanities, but on cartographical convenience and no little inertia. In truth, it is as easy to draw a firm line between Europe and Asia as it is to draw an accurate globe on flat paper.

The geologist can take two approaches: either Eurasia is one continent, being a single landmass with no narrow isthmus to divide it (indeed, one can make the case that Africa isn’t a separate continent either), or it is divided into at least six or seven continental plates. Unfortunately Europe is not one of these plates, as the Ural mountains are as geologically active as pocket lint. More interesting is the area of Anatolia and the Caucasus, where we can see the multiplicity of fault lines and minor plates:

(from seismo.ethz.ch)

We can see that a) large parts of the Balkans aren’t on the Eurasian plate, b) there is no plate boundary to the north of the Caspian sea that would divide Europe from Asia, and c) the entire Caucasus region is a crumple zone hundreds of kilometres wide. No precise boundaries there, it would seem.

Meanwhile, the anthropologist would point out that there has never been a significant cultural divide at the Urals: before the Russian Empire expanded into Siberia, the Huns, Mongols, Tatars and others had long since passed the other way. The steppe to the south of the Urals contains few landmarks and even fewer impediments to travel and trade. The tangled ethnic patchwork of the Caucasus offers more confusion than enlightenment. And to the south, the history and cultures of Greece and Turkey are as intertwined as Siamese twins; Hellenic, Roman and Byzantine from ancient times until the Crusades, they were unified once again in the Ottoman Empire (which conquered its dismembered predecessor more from within than without, and whose Sultan took the title “Roman Emperor”). After the 19th-century independence of Greece, there was a significant forced transfer of population based not on language or ethnicity but on religion, this being the true foundation of the modern division between Greece and Turkey.

Matthew Parris writes in the Times:

Much is written about Turkey and the European Union viewed from the West. From the West, Turkey is where Asia begins. Westerners reaching Istanbul from Europe are drawn by the Otherness of the lands at whose gates the city stands. Here we feel we leave the West.

That isn’t how it feels when you enter Turkey from the Middle East. I loved Syria – magical, different – but the place and its people seemed mysterious. Crossing into Turkey (all of us felt this) seemed somehow like coming home. There were road signs; traffic lights that drivers obeyed; you could read the writing; places and faces seemed open to us; women walked alone, bare-headed; shops and houses looked quietly middle class. From the train (small green fields, neat stations, stationmasters with caps and whistles) it could honestly have been Hungary. The Spain where my family arrived in 1974 felt more Third World.

Before writing off Turkey’s chances of joining the EU, people struck by what is alien about the country should take stock of what is familiar. Try arriving from the other side. Coming in from Asia, Istanbul feels like Liverpool with mosques.

To this day, Turkey claims to be a European country and consistently behaves as such. It has sought membership of every major post-war European organisation, and obtained it in every case but one – the EU. The main objectors to EU membership claim that Turkey is not a ‘European’ country but, as I have tried to show above, there is a shocking lack of objective evidence. Instead they distract from the main issue by focusing on current policy objections (free speech, Cyprus, etc.) which would need to be dealt with anyway, and are similar to issues that other EU-hopefuls have struggled with.

So where does this leave us? If Turkey is geographically not ‘European’, then what about Cyprus? If it is culturally not ‘European’, then what about Albania? No, the only self-consistent objection to Turkish EU membership is ‘there are too many Muslims in it’.

But nobody will say that.

California vs. Northern Ireland

From this article in the Economist:

[Californian] voters, moreover, have over time “self-sorted” themselves into highly partisan districts … The result is that elections are won during the Republican or Democratic primaries, rather than in run-offs between the two parties. This makes for a state legislature full of mad-eyed extremists in a state that otherwise has surprising numbers of reasonable citizens. … Because the Republicans are in a minority in the legislature, they have no sway until budget time, when they suddenly hold veto power thanks to the two-thirds requirement. Because in the primaries they have run on extremist platforms against other Republicans, they have no incentive to be pragmatic or moderate, and tend simply to balk.

With a little search and replace, this could easily describe Northern Ireland.

(Thanks, Ed!)

The Empire must die

At last, the (imperial) pound gets one over the Euro – Times Online

Oh, how the old-timers love their Imperial system. They’ll do anything to preserve their right to live in one of the only two countries in the entire world (the UK and the USA, for those who haven’t been paying attention) that believes using a system of measures that nobody understands is A Great Idea.

When I use the phrase “nobody understands”, I fully intend it to encompass the confusion that arises from the US and the UK not even using the same non-standard system, but two systems that are superficially similar but fundamentally incompatible. The US system of measurements (confusingly and utterly wrongly called “English” in its native land) corresponds with the UK’s (and to a lesser extent, Ireland’s) anachronistically named Imperial system only in units of length and some units of weight. Units of fluid capacity are so far out of whack that calling them by the same names is almost libellous.

When I use the phrase “nobody understands”, I also fully intend it to encompass the utter futility of learning a system where no two pairs of units are the same multiple of each other. Twelve inches in a foot, three feet in a yard, sixteen ounces in a pound, fourteen pounds in a stone. Who in their right mind wants to waste valuable brain cells remembering all of these? How many fluid ounces in a gallon? Don’t use the internet!

I furthermore fully intend it to encompass the fact that nobody in the UK under the age of 40 was taught Imperial units in school. That means the government has just wasted valuable political capital defending an item of “essential national culture” that has less of a future to look forward to than the North Sea cod fisheries.

Dear God, WHY?

Local income tax

Local income tax is an idea whose time has come. Don’t ask me, ask Michael:

Brown’s fallen into Salmond’s tax trap | Michael Portillo – Times Online

I find Portillo has been quietly impressive in his advocacy of sensible, progressive policies in the years since his little-lamented political demise. It makes me think that all politicians should take a parliament or two sabbatical to get their heads showered.

Roof falls in, part 2

I love Chris Davies’s idea, reported here, that the EU parliament should hold all 12 of its yearly diet of Strasbourg plenaries on one day. That’s the kind of creative political thinking that will end this farce.

I’ve just signed the petition at oneseat.eu

Roof falls in on European Parliament – The Irish Times – Wed, Aug 20, 2008

If only this could happen every month…

Roof falls in on European Parliament – The Irish Times – Wed, Aug 20, 2008

Russia, secession and the long game

Europeans, huddled in their densely-populated terrain, look eastward across the bleak nothingness of forest and steppe, and dream of bears and wolves. Russians look westwards across that same land and see an indefensible frontier that invading armies can, and regularly do, walk across without breaking stride. The Russian military instinct to hide behind weak buffer states is well-founded, and has been a guiding principle of foreign policy since 1945. Their neighbours’ fear, and often memory, of being so used is perhaps sufficient to explain why they are so willing to cast their allegiances elsewhere.

It has been said that Britain gained an empire by accident, as each Indian princeling in turn asked for, and inevitably got, protection against his rivals from the Raj, which itself gained in power as a result. Such positive feedback effects can easily become unstoppable. The medium-term result of the Georgian incident, regardless of who started it, will be to similarly accelerate the process of NATO expansion, whether individual countries like it or not. France and Germany will fret about being provocative, but telling a friendly, democratically-elected president that his country is not deserving of their protection will be a step too far. The membership process may be slow, but it is now merely a matter of when, not if.

This inescapable process is unfortunately driving a wedge between Russia and the West. Russian popular opinion is firmly behind Putin, who isn’t going anywhere soon. It took a generation for Britain to come to terms with the loss of its empire, and Russia has not yet acclimatised itself to its shrunken borders. Perhaps then the best the West can hope for is to sit out the Putin era without getting into a hot war. History shows that a strategic equilibrium can be achieved so long as cooler heads prevail on both sides; unfortunately in times of mutual suspicion a spark is all that it takes.

Europe today looks more like that of 1914 than of 1945, except the Caucasus is more Balkanised than the Balkans themselves. The flashpoints are obvious: Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan. In each case, an unpredictable, usually pro-Russian, minority has declared unilateral independence from a post-Soviet state that they believe does not represent their interests, and now look to their own Raj for protection. Russia has helped maintain these statelets without officially endorsing their independence, lest it be taken as a precedent for Chechnya. They are not alone in walking a rhetorical tightrope on secessionism: Kosovo is (partially) recognised but Bosnia must remain whole. Great powers may no longer carve up the territory of Europe at will, but their unfinished business still litters the tablecloth.

At the core of all these problems lies the legal no-man’s-land of UDI. States may dissolve themselves by mutual agreement, like the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, while changing borders by invasion is these days beyond the pale. But between these limiting cases of black and white there are no rules. Disputes between secessionist movements and their central governments have no forum, no case law, no agreed points of principle. Such things are an internal matter for the state itself, i.e. the stronger party, unless someone gets the big powers involved. It is thus in the interests of small, marginalised groups to make as much trouble as possible. Consequently it is in the interests of the big powers, if cooler heads are prevailing, to remove the incentives for them to do so.

There must therefore be a legal, codified route to unilateral independence. The chances of China signing up to any such agreement are zero, so its scope must by necessity be limited to Europe. Even so, the chances of such a deal are slim. It would involve a delicate balancing act: if the process is too onerous there will be no incentive for separatists to go legit; but without sufficient hoops to jump through, independence movements will sprout like mushrooms. Whatever the details, the likely effect would probably be to legitimise some of the secessionist statelets in post-Soviet space, while preventing the independence of Chechnya; any other outcome would be rejected out of hand by Russia. In return for Western acquiescence in their independence and voluntary alignment with Moscow, Russia would have to drop its objections to any other countries’ voluntary alignment with NATO.

This would stick in the craw of many, but may be the only realistic way to stabilise the region. No European government, with the possible exception of Belarus, would willingly accept the status of buffer state. The alternative would be the ever-present danger of the big powers getting sucked in to minor local squabbles, either accidentally or as part of a cunning plan. The creation of more pro-Russian exclaves (besides Kaliningrad) in NATO and EU territory would not be anyone’s ideal choice, but could be lived with if the rules of the game were clear.

Ultimately, there can be no lasting peace in Europe until the concepts of buffer states and spheres of influence have disappeared from the lexicon. It is clear, however, that the memes are alive and well in Russia. Both sides must ask themselves two questions: do we want a hot war? And if not, what is the alternative? I suggest that it is in the interests of both sides to play the long game.

After Lisbon – a heretical view

So Ireland voted no. May I make some humble suggestions to the great and good:

1. Take it like a man. I’m talking to you, Barroso. I don’t know what you wanted to achieve by claiming the treaty was still alive, but all you did was prove the No campaign’s point for them.
2. Don’t panic. There’s nothing in Lisbon that’s so urgent it can’t wait six or twelve months for the dust to settle. It’s not like you don’t have other things to be getting on with.
3. Deal with specific problems. If there’s something in particular holding up Croatia’s membership, treat it as part of their accession deal. Don’t try to do too much at once (e.g. consolidate the treaties, write a constitution and increase the powers of the EU).
4. Make the best of what you have. The Nice Treaty states that after the number of members exceeds 27, the size of the Commission will be reduced to less than 27. It could be argued that this is already sufficient legal basis for reform, so long as that reform is seen to be fair.
5. Be generous. It’s already accepted practice for the Council to nominate the EP’s suggested name for Commission President. How about letting him suggest the names of the other Commissioners? And you could voluntarily let your national parliaments have their debates on proposed directives. It’s amazing how much you can get done with a gentleman’s agreement.
6. Try to be popular. Aw, go on. You never know, the electorate might even grow to like you.

Nigel Farage of the UKIP was on Newsnight last night claiming, inconsistently, that a) if you don’t understand something, voting no is a good idea, but b) the result “obviously” means the Irish don’t want more political integration. It’s always hard having a debate with a Eurosceptic on such issues, as they have a habit of changing the subject to “get out” at the first opportunity.

Libertas vs. the Lisbon Treaty

Libertas has been campaigning loudly (and expensively) against the Lisbon Treaty, which now involves taking out full-page ads in local newspapers. In these ads, they repeat several old pieces of dressed-up nonsense about the Treaty. I reproduce them here in full for the purposes of dissection.

8 Reasons to Vote No to Lisbon

1. Creates an unelected President and a Foreign Minister of Europe

The new President and Foreign Minister for Europe will be appointed by the European Council by qualified majority vote. Although many of the terms and conditions of these roles have yet to be decided, they will be committed through the Lisbon Treaty to “drive forward” the agenda of the Council and discussions have already taken place to provide a presidential palace and executive jet for the President.

There is no such thing as “President of Europe”, and Libertas’s use of the term is deliberately misleading. The Treaty merely changes the existing part-time position of “President of the European Council” to a full-time job. Currently each head of government takes it in turn to be President for six months at a time, in addition to their real job. The President’s role is comparable to that of Secretary General of the UN.

The so-called “Foreign Minister” is similarly misrepresented. The EU already has a Foreign Relations Commissioner, whose brief will be expanded by Lisbon. Matters of foreign policy will remain subject to national veto, so the Foreign Representative will only be able to act if and when all governments have come to an agreement.

The agenda of the Council is set by the members of the Council, i.e. national heads of government. The Council President and Foreign Representative are appointed by the Council to help the Council get its job done – that’s what “drive forward the agenda” usually means. There is nothing remarkable about this.

The EU has considerable clout in the world, but has a very fragmented governance system which makes it hard for non-EU countries to deal with it effectively. These proposals introduce some needed continuity into the EU’s external relations. By using terminology that deliberately and misleadingly evokes the trappings of statehood, Libertas are attempting to turn these sensible proposals into bogeymen.

2. Halves Ireland’s voting weight while doubling Germany’s

The Lisbon Treaty would implement a new system of voting by the European Council which is primarily based on population size. This means that Ireland’s voting weight would be reduced from 2% at present to 0.8% if the Treaty was implemented, while Germany’s would increase from 8% to 17%.

Libertas have deliberately left out the rest of the new voting rules, which state that measures must be passed by 55% of the member states, representing at least 65% of the population. This was specifically designed to protect the interests of the smaller states. They also neglect to mention that Ireland (and all other small states) will remain significantly over-represented in the European Parliament.

Representation based on population is fair, especially when combined with protection for smaller states. The current voting system is based on arbitrary voting weights that were drawn up in back-room deals in which some countries got short-changed.

3. Abolishes Ireland’s Commissioner for five years at a time

The Lisbon Treaty proposes to reduce the number of Commissioners to two thirds of the number of member states. This would mean that, on a rotating basis, Ireland would have no seat for five years out of every 15 in the body that has the monopoly on initiating legislation. This would clearly affect a small country like Ireland to a far greater extent than, for example, Germany which is having its voting weight doubled under the Treaty.

This does not “clearly” do anything of the sort. They repeat their over-simplification of the new voting system, and again they forget to mention Ireland’s over-representation in Parliament, which is involved in amending all Commission legislation. They also gloss over the fact that a country of 4 million having the same status in the Commission as one of 80 million is the epitome of small-country power.

By contrast, under the current system they simply can’t find enough work for 27 Commissioners to do, and the problem of overstaffing will only get worse as more countries join.

4. Opens the door to interference in tax and other key economic interests

Article 113 of the Lisbon Treaty specifically inserts a new obligation on the European Council to act to avoid “distortion of competition” in respect of indirect taxes. The proposals for a common consolidated tax base and the commitment of the French government to pursue it combined with a weakening of Ireland’s voice in Europe through the loss of a permanent Commissioner and halving of its voting weight represent a clear and present danger to our tax competitiveness.

The CCTB can be vetoed at any time by Ireland under either the old or new systems. Commissioners and voting weights have absolutely nothing to do with it.

5. Hands over power in 60 areas of decision making to Brussels

The Lisbon Treaty provides for more than 60 areas of decision making from unanimity at present to qualified majority voting. Some of those areas include decision-making on immigration, sport, culture, transport and the appointment of the European President and Foreign Minister.

This is true. Whether you think it’s a bad thing or not all depends.

6. Gives exclusive competence to Brussels over International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment

For the first time, under the Lisbon Treaty foreign direct investment would become an exclusive competence of the EU as part of its common commercial policy. This means that the tools which have been used so successfully by the IDA to attract tens of thousands of jobs to Ireland will become the sole preserve of the European Union and the Irish Government will have to seek permissions

They mention international trade in the heading but not the body. This is because international trade has always been the exclusive competence of the EU and Europe as a whole has benefitted enormously from the arrangement. Foreign direct investment has come to Ireland for many reasons – mainly the English language and favourable tax rates, neither of which are threatened by Lisbon.

7. Enshrines EU law as superior to Irish law

On June 12th we will be voting on the 28th amendment to the Irish Constitution which clearly restates the following:

11° No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State that are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union referred to in subsection 10° of this section, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the said European Union or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the treaties referred to in this section, from having the force of law in the State.”

Not this old canard again (it’s a perennial favourite of British Eurosceptics).

Note the use of the word “restates”. This is because EU law has always been superior to national law. If countries were free to contradict any EU law they liked (or didn’t like), it wouldn’t be worth the paper it was written on. That’s how it works.

Lisbon changes nothing.

8. The Treaty can be changed without another referendum

Article 48 of the Treaty enables changes to be made to it after ratification without the constitutional requirement for another referendum in Ireland. This is confirmed by the independent Referendum Commission on its website which states: there “may” be a requirement for a referendum to implement such changes.

Yes, but only some provisions may be so amended, and all such changes are subject to national veto. A referendum is required in Ireland if (and only if) the Irish Constitution needs to be amended – this is a matter of Irish constitutional law and is unaffected by Lisbon.

on the Union Jack

A while ago, Ian Lucas and Margaret Hodge suggested that a redesign of the Union Jack might be in order, so as to include a symbol of that oft-forgotten country, Wales. Several sites have taken up the challenge [1] [2] to produce a new flag, but most of the efforts have been less than pretty. These designs fall mostly into two categories – Dragons and Davids.

The former try to include a Welsh Dragon on the existing flag, but it looks badly out of place no matter how hard you try. In any case, when a country blazons its flag with a shield or crest, this is almost always intended as a unifying symbol, not an afterthought.

The latter take a more subtle approach – keep to the crosses theme and use the cross of St. David, which is like that of St. George except gold on black. The problem with this is that adding two more colours to the existing three makes it look very messy. Don’t let the South Africans fool you: it’s very hard to pull off a rainbow-coloured flag (just ask the Central African Republic).

I believe the solution is simple – ditch the black from St. David but keep the gold. It can then be superimposed on the cross of St. George thus:

(original image pilfered from [2] above)

This has the advantage of not requiring any of the other proportions of the flag to be changed, and keeps with heraldic principles by having the gold (a metal) touch only red (a colour). I’ve looked at the two side by side for a while now and I honestly think the new one is prettier, as the gold highlight gives the whole a lift and sparkle which was lacking before.

I commend this motion to the House.